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Abstract:	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠgame	 ﾠtheoretic	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠof	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠfamous	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠbluffs	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
history.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlegend	 ﾠof	 ﾠLi	 ﾠGuang	 ﾠand	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ100	 ﾠhorsemen	 ﾠ(144	 ﾠBC),	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠlegend	 ﾠof	 ﾠZhuge	 ﾠLiang	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEmpty	 ﾠCity	 ﾠ(228	 ﾠA.D.).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠboth	 ﾠlegends,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
military	 ﾠcommander	 ﾠfaces	 ﾠa	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠstronger	 ﾠopposing	 ﾠarmy,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠof	 ﾠordering	 ﾠ
his	 ﾠmen	 ﾠto	 ﾠretreat,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠorders	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠact	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠbaiting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
enemy	 ﾠinto	 ﾠan	 ﾠambush.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠstronger	 ﾠopposing	 ﾠarmy,	 ﾠuncertain	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠfacing	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
weak	 ﾠopponent	 ﾠor	 ﾠan	 ﾠambush,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠdecides	 ﾠto	 ﾠflee	 ﾠand	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠbattle.	 ﾠMilitary	 ﾠ
scholars	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠboth	 ﾠstories	 ﾠto	 ﾠillustrate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeception	 ﾠin	 ﾠwarfare,	 ﾠ
often	 ﾠhighlighting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcreativity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgenerals’	 ﾠstrategies.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠboth	 ﾠ
situations	 ﾠas	 ﾠsignaling	 ﾠgames	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopponent	 ﾠis	 ﾠuncertain	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
general	 ﾠis	 ﾠweak	 ﾠ(i.e.,	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfew	 ﾠsoldiers)	 ﾠor	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠ(i.e.,	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠarmy	 ﾠwaiting	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
ambush	 ﾠhis	 ﾠopponent	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠcombat).	 ﾠWe	 ﾠthen	 ﾠderive	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunique	 ﾠPerfect	 ﾠ
Bayesian	 ﾠEquilibrium	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgames.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠweak	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠis	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠ
enough,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠinvolves	 ﾠmixed	 ﾠstrategies,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠweak	 ﾠgenerals	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠ
fleeing	 ﾠand	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠbluffing	 ﾠabout	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠstrength.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠalways	 ﾠ
involves	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgenerals	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠopponents	 ﾠacting	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdid	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠ
examples	 ﾠwith	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠa	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠprobability.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠweak	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠlower	 ﾠ(which	 ﾠis	 ﾠreasonable	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreputations	 ﾠof	 ﾠLi	 ﾠGuang	 ﾠand	 ﾠZhuge	 ﾠLiang),	 ﾠ
then	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunique	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠalways	 ﾠinvolves	 ﾠbluffing	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠand	 ﾠretreat	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
his	 ﾠopponent.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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“All	 ﾠwarfare	 ﾠis	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠdeception”	 ﾠ
“The	 ﾠenemy	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠengage	 ﾠme	 ﾠin	 ﾠcombat:	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠdistract	 ﾠhim,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠdirection”	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ –	 ﾠSun-ﾭtzu,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠArt	 ﾠof	 ﾠWar	 ﾠ
Introduction	 ﾠ
War	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalways	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdeception.	 ﾠSome	 ﾠexamples,	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTrojan	 ﾠHorse	 ﾠused	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGreeks	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ12th	 ﾠor	 ﾠ11th	 ﾠcentury	 ﾠBC	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAllied	 ﾠmisinformation	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠduring	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar	 ﾠII,	 ﾠwere	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠ
attempts	 ﾠto	 ﾠtrick	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠenemy	 ﾠinto	 ﾠlowering	 ﾠits	 ﾠguard	 ﾠor	 ﾠexposing	 ﾠ
vulnerabilities.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠother	 ﾠexamples,	 ﾠdeception	 ﾠ(by	 ﾠbluffing	 ﾠabout	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠown	 ﾠ
strength)	 ﾠallowed	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠcommanders	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠconflict	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
powerful	 ﾠenemy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠare	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlater	 ﾠcategory	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeception,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
military	 ﾠbluff.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠpresents	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠgame-ﾭ‐theoretic	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠof	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠ
famous	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠbluffs	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠhistory.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
legend	 ﾠof	 ﾠLi	 ﾠGuang	 ﾠand	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ100	 ﾠhorsemen	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHan	 ﾠDynasty	 ﾠ(144	 ﾠBC)	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlegend	 ﾠof	 ﾠZhuge	 ﾠLiang	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEmpty	 ﾠCity	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠThree	 ﾠKingdom	 ﾠ
period	 ﾠof	 ﾠChina	 ﾠ(228	 ﾠA.D.).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠboth	 ﾠlegends,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠcommander	 ﾠfaces	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
much	 ﾠstronger	 ﾠopposing	 ﾠarmy,	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠof	 ﾠordering	 ﾠhis	 ﾠmen	 ﾠto	 ﾠretreat,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠ
orders	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠact	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠbaiting	 ﾠhis	 ﾠenemy	 ﾠinto	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
ambush.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠstronger	 ﾠopposing	 ﾠarmy,	 ﾠuncertain	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠfacing	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
weak	 ﾠopponent	 ﾠor	 ﾠan	 ﾠambush,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠdecides	 ﾠto	 ﾠflee	 ﾠand	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠbattle.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠweak	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠcommander	 ﾠbluffs,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstronger	 ﾠopponent	 ﾠfalls	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
bluff.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 4	 ﾠ
Since	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠoccurrence	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠmillennia	 ﾠago,	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠscholars	 ﾠhave	 ﾠoften	 ﾠ
referred	 ﾠto	 ﾠthese	 ﾠlegends	 ﾠas	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠof	 ﾠmasterful	 ﾠstrategy.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
story	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ100	 ﾠhorsemen	 ﾠis	 ﾠused	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtraditional	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠcommentary	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
Sun-ﾭ‐tzu’s	 ﾠThe	 ﾠArt	 ﾠof	 ﾠWar	 ﾠto	 ﾠillustrate	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠSun-ﾭ‐tzu	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠby	 ﾠdeception.1	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
referring	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstory,	 ﾠeighth-ﾭ‐century	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠstrategist	 ﾠand	 ﾠoriginal	 ﾠArt	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
War	 ﾠcommentator	 ﾠLi	 ﾠQuan	 ﾠexplains:	 ﾠ“Puzzle	 ﾠ[the	 ﾠenemy]	 ﾠby	 ﾠstrange	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
unusual	 ﾠdispositions,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠmake	 ﾠit	 ﾠimpossible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhim	 ﾠto	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠbattle.”2	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠlegend	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEmpty	 ﾠCity	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“Stratagem	 ﾠof	 ﾠOpen	 ﾠCity	 ﾠ
Gates”	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠancient	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠtreatise	 ﾠThirty-ﾭSix	 ﾠ
Stratagems.3	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠdepicted	 ﾠin	 ﾠRomance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠThree	 ﾠKingdoms,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
widely	 ﾠregarded	 ﾠby	 ﾠscholars	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFour	 ﾠGreat	 ﾠClassical	 ﾠNovels	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Chinese	 ﾠHistory	 ﾠ(Luo	 ﾠGuanzhong,	 ﾠ14th	 ﾠcent./2004).	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthis	 ﾠarticle,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠlegendary	 ﾠsituations	 ﾠas	 ﾠgames,	 ﾠand	 ﾠshow	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠbluffing	 ﾠarises	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠrational	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠstrategy.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠgame-ﾭ‐
theoretic	 ﾠterms,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgenerals	 ﾠplay	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignaling	 ﾠgame	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠan	 ﾠopponent	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠuncertain	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠis	 ﾠweak	 ﾠ(i.e.,	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfew	 ﾠsoldiers)	 ﾠor	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠ(i.e.,	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠarmy	 ﾠwaiting	 ﾠto	 ﾠambush	 ﾠhis	 ﾠopponent	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠcombat).	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠmay	 ﾠorder	 ﾠhis	 ﾠsoldiers	 ﾠto	 ﾠflee,	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠstand	 ﾠfirm.	 ﾠA	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
1	 ﾠFor	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠand	 ﾠtranslation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠArt	 ﾠof	 ﾠWar	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠcommentary,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreader	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmodern	 ﾠJohn	 ﾠMinford	 ﾠtranslation	 ﾠ(Sun-ﾭ‐tzu,	 ﾠ6th	 ﾠcent.	 ﾠBC/2003).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠSee	 ﾠSun-ﾭ‐tzu	 ﾠ(6th	 ﾠcent.	 ﾠBC/2003:	 ﾠ184).	 ﾠLi	 ﾠQuan	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠ11	 ﾠancient	 ﾠscholars	 ﾠon	 ﾠThe	 ﾠArt	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
War	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠcomments	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfound	 ﾠin	 ﾠmodern	 ﾠday	 ﾠtranslations	 ﾠof	 ﾠSun-ﾭ‐tzu’s	 ﾠtext.	 ﾠLi	 ﾠQuan	 ﾠ
uses	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstory	 ﾠof	 ﾠLi	 ﾠGuang	 ﾠto	 ﾠillustrate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠSun-ﾭ‐tzu	 ﾠquote	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
beginning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠarticle.	 ﾠTwo	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠcommentators—Du	 ﾠMu	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTang	 ﾠDynasty	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠZhang	 ﾠYu	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSong	 ﾠDynasty—use	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstory	 ﾠof	 ﾠZhuge	 ﾠLiang	 ﾠto	 ﾠillustrate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ
point.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠThe	 ﾠopen	 ﾠcity	 ﾠgates	 ﾠstratagem	 ﾠstates:	 ﾠ“When	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenemy	 ﾠis	 ﾠsuperior	 ﾠin	 ﾠnumbers	 ﾠand	 ﾠyour	 ﾠ
situation	 ﾠis	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠthat	 ﾠyou	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠoverrun	 ﾠat	 ﾠany	 ﾠmoment,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠdrop	 ﾠall	 ﾠpretence	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
military	 ﾠpreparedness	 ﾠand	 ﾠact	 ﾠcasually.	 ﾠUnless	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenemy	 ﾠhas	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccurate	 ﾠdescription	 ﾠof	 ﾠyour	 ﾠ
situation	 ﾠthis	 ﾠunusual	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠwill	 ﾠarouse	 ﾠsuspicion.	 ﾠWith	 ﾠluck	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdissuaded	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
attacking”	 ﾠ(Verstappen,	 ﾠ1999:	 ﾠ169)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ
always	 ﾠprefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠstand	 ﾠfirm,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠa	 ﾠweak	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠprefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠstand	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
if	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠattacked	 ﾠby	 ﾠhis	 ﾠopponent.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsetting,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠexists	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠunique	 ﾠPerfect	 ﾠBayesian	 ﾠEquilibrium	 ﾠ(PBE)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgame.4	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
probability	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠis	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠenough,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPBE	 ﾠinvolves	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠ
always	 ﾠstanding	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠeven	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠweak.	 ﾠOtherwise	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPBE	 ﾠinvolves	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
general	 ﾠplaying	 ﾠa	 ﾠmixed	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhe	 ﾠstands	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠwith	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠ
probability.	 ﾠUnder	 ﾠno	 ﾠparameter	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠthere	 ﾠexist	 ﾠan	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠalways	 ﾠretreats.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Such	 ﾠsignaling	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠare	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapplied	 ﾠgame	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠliterature,	 ﾠ
famously	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠSpense’s	 ﾠ(1974)	 ﾠjob	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠsignaling,	 ﾠand	 ﾠAckerlof’s	 ﾠ
(1970)	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠfor	 ﾠlemons.	 ﾠMost	 ﾠnotably,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsimilarities	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgenerals’	 ﾠsituations	 ﾠand	 ﾠCho	 ﾠ&	 ﾠKreps’	 ﾠ(1987)	 ﾠbeer-ﾭ‐quiche	 ﾠgame,	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠweak	 ﾠplayer	 ﾠacts	 ﾠas	 ﾠif	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠtough	 ﾠ(by	 ﾠdrinking	 ﾠbeer	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhe	 ﾠ
dislikes,	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠof	 ﾠordering	 ﾠquiche	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhe	 ﾠenjoys)	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠa	 ﾠfight	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠa	 ﾠbully.5	 ﾠAs	 ﾠfar	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠknow,	 ﾠours	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠto	 ﾠapply	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignaling	 ﾠ
framework	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlegends	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ100	 ﾠhorsemen	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEmpty	 ﾠCity,	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
Art	 ﾠof	 ﾠWar	 ﾠcommentary	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠThirty-ﾭSix	 ﾠStratagems	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgenerally.6	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
4	 ﾠFor	 ﾠdetails	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠPBE	 ﾠsee	 ﾠFudenberg	 ﾠ&	 ﾠTirole	 ﾠ(1991).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠThe	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠof	 ﾠbluffing	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠhere	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhas	 ﾠsimilarities	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠof	 ﾠbluffing	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
von	 ﾠNeumann	 ﾠand	 ﾠMorgenstern	 ﾠ(1944).	 ﾠSee	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsection	 ﾠon	 ﾠpoker	 ﾠand	 ﾠbluffing.	 ﾠ
However,	 ﾠvon	 ﾠNeumann	 ﾠand	 ﾠMorgenstern’s	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠtook	 ﾠplace	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Nash	 ﾠEquilibrium	 ﾠand	 ﾠBayesian	 ﾠgames.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠNiou	 ﾠ&	 ﾠOrdeshook	 ﾠ(1994)	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠThe	 ﾠArt	 ﾠof	 ﾠWar	 ﾠ(without	 ﾠcommentary)	 ﾠfully	 ﾠ
captures	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠstrategies.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠportions	 ﾠof	 ﾠSun-ﾭ‐tzu’s	 ﾠ
reasoning,	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠincomplete	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠis	 ﾠ“vulnerable	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
complete	 ﾠstrategic	 ﾠanalysis”	 ﾠ(1994:	 ﾠ161).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsurprising,	 ﾠas	 ﾠSun-ﾭ‐tzu’s	 ﾠwriting	 ﾠ
dates	 ﾠback	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠhalf	 ﾠmillennia,	 ﾠwell	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠThomas	 ﾠBayes	 ﾠshowed	 ﾠus	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠ
update	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠ(Bayes,	 ﾠ1764).	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠshow,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠof	 ﾠLi	 ﾠGuang	 ﾠand	 ﾠZhuge	 ﾠ
Liang	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠsuffer	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠshortcomings,	 ﾠas	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠstrategies	 ﾠare	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠunder	 ﾠincomplete	 ﾠinformation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ
Our	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠjust	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠcommentary	 ﾠon	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠ
famous	 ﾠbluffs	 ﾠin	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠhistory.	 ﾠThree	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠcontributions	 ﾠare	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠmodern	 ﾠday	 ﾠstrategists	 ﾠand	 ﾠgame	 ﾠtheorists.	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠadds	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
growing	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠgame	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠis	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠgain	 ﾠa	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠ
understanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠhistoric	 ﾠevents	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠan	 ﾠoverview	 ﾠsee	 ﾠGreif,	 ﾠ2002).	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
widely	 ﾠrecognized	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠlong	 ﾠtime)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbluffs	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
Li	 ﾠGuang	 ﾠand	 ﾠZhuge	 ﾠLiang	 ﾠwere	 ﾠcreative	 ﾠand	 ﾠultimately	 ﾠsuccessful,	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
analysis	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠformal	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠtactics	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
successful.	 ﾠUnlike	 ﾠother	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeception,	 ﾠbluffing	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠ
opponent	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsusceptible	 ﾠto	 ﾠcheap	 ﾠtalk,	 ﾠlies,	 ﾠor	 ﾠother	 ﾠmisinformation.	 ﾠ
Rather,	 ﾠbluffing	 ﾠallows	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠfully	 ﾠrational	 ﾠopponent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠfully	 ﾠrational	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠ
Bluffing	 ﾠprevents	 ﾠconflict	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenemy	 ﾠis	 ﾠdeceived	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
opponent	 ﾠis	 ﾠstrong,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenemy	 ﾠremains	 ﾠuncertain	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
opponent’s	 ﾠstrength	 ﾠand	 ﾠthis	 ﾠuncertainty	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠattacking	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠrisky.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Second,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠcontributes	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠon	 ﾠdeception	 ﾠfor	 ﾠstrategic	 ﾠ
advantage,	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠin	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠand	 ﾠdefense	 ﾠsituations	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠCrawford,	 ﾠ
2003;	 ﾠZhuang,	 ﾠBier	 ﾠ&	 ﾠAlagoz,	 ﾠ2010;	 ﾠZhuang	 ﾠ&	 ﾠBier,	 ﾠforthcoming).	 ﾠOther	 ﾠ
articles	 ﾠon	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtopics	 ﾠoften	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠdeception	 ﾠas	 ﾠcostless	 ﾠlying	 ﾠor	 ﾠcheap	 ﾠtalk.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠour	 ﾠmodel,	 ﾠdeception	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠweak	 ﾠplayer	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠactions	 ﾠto	 ﾠact	 ﾠas	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠare	 ﾠstronger	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthey	 ﾠactually	 ﾠare	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠpooling).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
framework	 ﾠallows	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdeception	 ﾠeven	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠ
communication	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠplayers.	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠframework	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
employ	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnew	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠCho	 ﾠ&	 ﾠKreps,	 ﾠ1987),	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠunaware	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
applications	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠto	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠstrategy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Third,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠbring	 ﾠto	 ﾠlight	 ﾠanother	 ﾠsetting	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠprofessionals	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
case	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠcommanders)	 ﾠintuitively	 ﾠplay	 ﾠgame-ﾭ‐theoretic	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 7	 ﾠ
strategies.	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠLi	 ﾠGuang	 ﾠand	 ﾠZhuge	 ﾠLiang	 ﾠlacked	 ﾠformal	 ﾠtraining	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
probability	 ﾠtheory,	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠfamiliarity	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠinteractions	 ﾠallowed	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“if	 ﾠhe	 ﾠknows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠknow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠknows…”	 ﾠlogic	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
choose	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠstrategies.	 ﾠHaywood	 ﾠ(1954)	 ﾠpresents	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
World	 ﾠWar	 ﾠII	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠgenerals	 ﾠbenefited	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠgame	 ﾠtheoretic	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
complete	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠenvironments.	 ﾠOthers	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠmore	 ﾠmodern-ﾭ‐day	 ﾠ
evidence	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠvein.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprofessional	 ﾠ
soccer	 ﾠplayers	 ﾠplay	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠstrategies	 ﾠduring	 ﾠpenalty	 ﾠkicks	 ﾠ(i.e.,	 ﾠPalacios-ﾭ‐
Huerta,	 ﾠ2003)	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠlaboratory	 ﾠexperiments	 ﾠ(i.e.,	 ﾠPalacios-ﾭ‐Huerta	 ﾠ&	 ﾠVolij,	 ﾠ
2008).7	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠproceeds	 ﾠas	 ﾠfollows.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsection	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstory	 ﾠof	 ﾠLi	 ﾠGuang	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ100	 ﾠhorsemen.	 ﾠSection	 ﾠ3	 ﾠconsiders	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstory	 ﾠof	 ﾠZhuge	 ﾠLiang	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Empty	 ﾠCity.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ100	 ﾠhorsemen	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠis	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠin	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdetail	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Empty	 ﾠCity	 ﾠmodel,	 ﾠas	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠoverlap	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠSection	 ﾠ
4	 ﾠconcludes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠresults.	 ﾠ
Legend	 ﾠof	 ﾠLi	 ﾠGuang	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ100	 ﾠhorsemen	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ144	 ﾠBC	 ﾠChina,	 ﾠlegendary	 ﾠHan	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠLi	 ﾠGuang	 ﾠran	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠbit	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrouble.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠand	 ﾠ100	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠmen	 ﾠwere	 ﾠout	 ﾠriding	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountryside.	 ﾠFar	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmain	 ﾠassembly	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠarmy,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwere	 ﾠcome	 ﾠupon	 ﾠby	 ﾠseveral-ﾭ‐thousand	 ﾠ
Xiongnu	 ﾠforces.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠXiongnu	 ﾠcould	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠkill	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ100	 ﾠriders	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠ
engaged	 ﾠin	 ﾠbattle.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠXiongnu	 ﾠwere	 ﾠuncertain	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠhundred	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠOther	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠpresents	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠexperienced	 ﾠplayers	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠoptimally	 ﾠ
mix	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠactions	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠplaying	 ﾠmixed	 ﾠstrategies.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample	 ﾠWalker	 ﾠ&	 ﾠWooders	 ﾠ
(2001)	 ﾠand	 ﾠKovash	 ﾠ&	 ﾠLevitt	 ﾠ(2009).	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠviolations	 ﾠof	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠoften	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠ
violations	 ﾠof	 ﾠserial	 ﾠindependence	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠactions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmake	 ﾠup	 ﾠmixed	 ﾠstrategies	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠ
football	 ﾠteams	 ﾠswitch	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠrunning	 ﾠand	 ﾠpassing	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠoften).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠapplicable	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
analysis,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠobserved	 ﾠaction	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgenerals	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
examples	 ﾠis	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunique	 ﾠPBEs	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠsituations.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 8	 ﾠ
riders	 ﾠwere	 ﾠtraveling	 ﾠalone,	 ﾠor	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwere	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠof	 ﾠHan	 ﾠ
soldiers	 ﾠhiding	 ﾠnearby.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Li	 ﾠGuang	 ﾠhad	 ﾠto	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠto	 ﾠorder	 ﾠhis	 ﾠtroops	 ﾠto	 ﾠretreat,	 ﾠor	 ﾠorder	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠprepare	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbattle.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ100	 ﾠHan	 ﾠretreated,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠXiongnu	 ﾠsoldiers	 ﾠcould	 ﾠ
chase	 ﾠthem	 ﾠdown	 ﾠand	 ﾠLi	 ﾠGuang’s	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠwould	 ﾠsuffer	 ﾠcasualties.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHan	 ﾠ
soldiers	 ﾠengaged	 ﾠin	 ﾠbattle	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwould	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠsurely	 ﾠall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠkilled.	 ﾠ	 ﾠLi	 ﾠ
Guang,	 ﾠknowing	 ﾠfull	 ﾠwell	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhis	 ﾠmen	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠkilled	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠengaged	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
battle,	 ﾠnevertheless	 ﾠordered	 ﾠhis	 ﾠmen	 ﾠto	 ﾠdismount,	 ﾠsend	 ﾠaway	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠhorses,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠready	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcombat.	 ﾠUpon	 ﾠseeing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
outnumbered	 ﾠHan	 ﾠsoldiers,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠXiongnu	 ﾠforces	 ﾠfled,	 ﾠworried	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHan	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠtrying	 ﾠto	 ﾠbait	 ﾠthem	 ﾠinto	 ﾠan	 ﾠambush.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Formal	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠadapt	 ﾠa	 ﾠclassic	 ﾠsignaling	 ﾠgame	 ﾠframework	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠplayer	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠand	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠ
available	 ﾠactions	 ﾠper	 ﾠplayer,	 ﾠto	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstory	 ﾠof	 ﾠLi	 ﾠGuang	 ﾠ(we	 ﾠdo	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ
again	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstory	 ﾠof	 ﾠZhuge	 ﾠLiang	 ﾠin	 ﾠSection	 ﾠ3).8	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠare	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠplayers,	 ﾠLi	 ﾠGuang	 ﾠ(i.e.	 ﾠLG)	 ﾠand	 ﾠan	 ﾠunknown	 ﾠXiongnu	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠ
(i.e.,	 ﾠGenX).	 ﾠ	 ﾠLG	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠtypes;	 ﾠeither	 ﾠhe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠHan	 ﾠ
army	 ﾠ(i.e.,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠstrong)	 ﾠor	 ﾠhe	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ(i.e.,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠweak).	 ﾠHe	 ﾠknows	 ﾠhis	 ﾠown	 ﾠ
type,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠGenX	 ﾠonly	 ﾠknows	 ﾠthe	 ﾠex	 ﾠante	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠstrong,	 ﾠdenoted	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
λ∈(0,1).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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8	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠone	 ﾠcould	 ﾠenvision	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠframework	 ﾠto	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠ
interactions,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠwe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠhas	 ﾠits	 ﾠadvantages.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠframework	 ﾠcaptures	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmost	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsituations,	 ﾠand	 ﾠallows	 ﾠfor	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠdevelop	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠintuition	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgames.	 ﾠLarger	 ﾠtype	 ﾠspaces	 ﾠor	 ﾠaction	 ﾠspaces	 ﾠwill	 ﾠdo	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠto	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
understanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsituation.	 ﾠAlso,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsimilarities	 ﾠto	 ﾠclassic	 ﾠsignaling	 ﾠgames	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠ
Spense	 ﾠ1974,	 ﾠCho	 ﾠ&	 ﾠKreps	 ﾠ1987),	 ﾠmost	 ﾠgame	 ﾠtheorists	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfamiliar	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠ
structure.	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ 9	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠsequential-ﾭ‐move	 ﾠgame	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠplace	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠorder.	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠLG	 ﾠchooses	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠto	 ﾠretreat,	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠprepare	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbattle.	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠGenX,	 ﾠupon	 ﾠobserving	 ﾠLG’s	 ﾠ
action,	 ﾠdecides	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠhis	 ﾠown	 ﾠforces	 ﾠretreat	 ﾠor	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠbattle.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠLG	 ﾠ
retreats,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠGenX	 ﾠengaging	 ﾠin	 ﾠbattle	 ﾠinvolves	 ﾠchasing	 ﾠdown	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfleeing	 ﾠHan.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ1	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextensive	 ﾠform	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgame,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdepicts	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpayoffs,	 ﾠlisting	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpayoff	 ﾠfor	 ﾠLG	 ﾠthen	 ﾠfor	 ﾠGenX.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Han	 ﾠand	 ﾠXiongnu	 ﾠare	 ﾠplaying	 ﾠa	 ﾠzero	 ﾠsum	 ﾠgame,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠpayoffs	 ﾠequal	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
casualties	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠside	 ﾠminus	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠown	 ﾠcasualties.9	 ﾠThe	 ﾠparameters	 ﾠα	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠβ	 ﾠdenote	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠHan	 ﾠsoldiers	 ﾠwho	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠkilled	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
retreat;	 ﾠboth	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠare	 ﾠon	 ﾠ(0,1).10	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠparameter	 ﾠw	 ﾠis	 ﾠpositive.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
[Insert	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ1	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhere]	 ﾠ
Equilibrium	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠsolves	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPerfect	 ﾠBayesian	 ﾠEquilibrium	 ﾠ(PBE)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgame,	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠallows	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠsubgame	 ﾠperfect	 ﾠsolutions	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠBayesian	 ﾠgame	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
incomplete	 ﾠinformation.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠa	 ﾠPBE,	 ﾠneither	 ﾠplayer	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave	 ﾠan	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
deviate	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠplayed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠplayer	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠplayer’s	 ﾠtype.	 ﾠBelief’s	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠplayer’s	 ﾠ
type	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠBayes’	 ﾠRule	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠex	 ﾠante	 ﾠprobabilities	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠopponent’s	 ﾠstrategies.	 ﾠProposition	 ﾠ1	 ﾠsummarizes	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠbehavior.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠAssuming	 ﾠa	 ﾠzero	 ﾠsum	 ﾠgame	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlinear	 ﾠpayoff	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠessential	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalysis.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠintuition	 ﾠcontinues	 ﾠto	 ﾠhold	 ﾠin	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠsettings,	 ﾠas	 ﾠlong	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠranking	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠoutcomes	 ﾠare	 ﾠunchanged	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠplayer.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
10	 ﾠThe	 ﾠgame	 ﾠassumes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeven	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠLG	 ﾠwill	 ﾠsuffer	 ﾠcasualties	 ﾠas	 ﾠhe	 ﾠretreats,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
vulnerable	 ﾠto	 ﾠattack	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠretreating.	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠit	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠsense	 ﾠthat	 ﾠα>β,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠan	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresults.	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Proposition	 ﾠ1:	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠλ	 ﾠ≥	 ﾠ100/(100	 ﾠ+	 ﾠw),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunique	 ﾠPBE	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠpooling	 ﾠ
equilibrium	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠLG	 ﾠalways	 ﾠprepares	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbattle,	 ﾠand	 ﾠGenX	 ﾠretreats	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠLG	 ﾠ
prepares	 ﾠand	 ﾠengages	 ﾠif	 ﾠLG	 ﾠretreats.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
When	 ﾠλ	 ﾠ<	 ﾠ100/(100	 ﾠ+	 ﾠw),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunique	 ﾠPBE	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠmixed-ﾭstrategies,	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠLG	 ﾠ
prepares	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbattle	 ﾠwith	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠ1	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠand	 ﾠwith	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠ
wλ/(100	 ﾠ(1	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠλ))	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠweak;	 ﾠGenX	 ﾠengages	 ﾠwith	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠ1	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠLG	 ﾠ
retreats	 ﾠand	 ﾠwith	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠα	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠLG	 ﾠprepares	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbattle.	 ﾠ
Proof:	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠGenX	 ﾠalways	 ﾠengages	 ﾠa	 ﾠfleeing	 ﾠHan	 ﾠarmy,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠLG	 ﾠalways	 ﾠprepares	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbattle.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠboth	 ﾠ100α	 ﾠ>	 ﾠ0	 ﾠand	 ﾠ100β	 ﾠ>	 ﾠ0,	 ﾠ
engaging	 ﾠa	 ﾠretreating	 ﾠarmy	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrictly	 ﾠdominate	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠfor	 ﾠGenX.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Therefore,	 ﾠif	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠLG	 ﾠretreats,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠearns	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐100	 ﾠβ.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠhe	 ﾠprepares	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbattle,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠ
earns	 ﾠeither	 ﾠzero	 ﾠor	 ﾠw,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐100	 ﾠβ.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠ
LG	 ﾠalways	 ﾠprepares	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbattle.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠthree	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠequilibrium:	 ﾠ(i)	 ﾠa	 ﾠseparating	 ﾠ
equilibrium	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠLG	 ﾠalways	 ﾠprepares	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠweak	 ﾠLG	 ﾠalways	 ﾠ
retreats,	 ﾠ(ii)	 ﾠa	 ﾠpooling	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠboth	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠand	 ﾠweak	 ﾠLG	 ﾠ
always	 ﾠprepares	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbattle,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(iii)	 ﾠa	 ﾠmixed-ﾭ‐strategy	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
strong	 ﾠLG	 ﾠalways	 ﾠprepares,	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠweak	 ﾠLG	 ﾠmixes	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠpreparation	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
retreat.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠrule	 ﾠout	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠ(i)	 ﾠby	 ﾠcontradiction.	 ﾠSuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠweak	 ﾠLG	 ﾠalways	 ﾠ
retreats.	 ﾠConsistency	 ﾠ(a	 ﾠrequirement	 ﾠof	 ﾠPBE)	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠthat	 ﾠGenX’s	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠput	 ﾠ
probability	 ﾠone	 ﾠon	 ﾠLG	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠprepares	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbattle.	 ﾠKnowing	 ﾠ
this,	 ﾠa	 ﾠweak	 ﾠLG	 ﾠalso	 ﾠprefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠprepare	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbattle	 ﾠ(payoff	 ﾠ0)	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠflee	 ﾠ
(payoff	 ﾠ–100	 ﾠα).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠcontradiction	 ﾠrules	 ﾠout	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠ(i).	 ﾠ	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Consider	 ﾠnow	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠ(ii).	 ﾠIf	 ﾠa	 ﾠweak	 ﾠLG	 ﾠalways	 ﾠprepares	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbattle,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠ
consistency	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠGenX’s	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠmust	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠprobabilities.	 ﾠ
That	 ﾠis,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠprepared	 ﾠopponent	 ﾠis	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠwith	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠλ	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠweak	 ﾠwith	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠ(1	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠλ).	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠ–wλ	 ﾠ+	 ﾠ100	 ﾠ(1	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠλ)	 ﾠ>	 ﾠ0,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
equivalently	 ﾠλ	 ﾠ<	 ﾠ100/(100	 ﾠ+	 ﾠw),	 ﾠGenX	 ﾠattacks	 ﾠa	 ﾠprepared	 ﾠopponent,	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
case	 ﾠa	 ﾠweak	 ﾠLG	 ﾠprefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠflee—a	 ﾠcontradiction.	 ﾠAlternatively,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠλ	 ﾠ≥	 ﾠ
100/(100	 ﾠ+	 ﾠw),	 ﾠGenX	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠattack	 ﾠa	 ﾠprepared	 ﾠopponent,	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcase	 ﾠ
neither	 ﾠLG	 ﾠor	 ﾠGenX	 ﾠhas	 ﾠan	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeviate.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠλ	 ﾠ≥	 ﾠ100/(100	 ﾠ+	 ﾠ
w),	 ﾠthere	 ﾠexists	 ﾠan	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠboth	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠand	 ﾠweak	 ﾠLG	 ﾠprepares,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠGenX	 ﾠretreats	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠLG	 ﾠprepares	 ﾠand	 ﾠengages	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠLG	 ﾠretreats.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Consider	 ﾠnow	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠ(iii).	 ﾠSuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠweak	 ﾠLG	 ﾠplays	 ﾠa	 ﾠmixed	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhe	 ﾠprepares	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbattle	 ﾠwith	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠq	 ﾠand	 ﾠhe	 ﾠflees	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
probability	 ﾠ(1	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠq).	 ﾠ	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠGenX	 ﾠobserves	 ﾠ
preparation,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠattacks	 ﾠwith	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠr	 ﾠand	 ﾠretreats	 ﾠwith	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠ(1	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ
r).	 ﾠSince	 ﾠLG	 ﾠmixes,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠindifferent	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠboth	 ﾠpreparation	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
retreat,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠif	 ﾠand	 ﾠonly	 ﾠif	 ﾠr	 ﾠ=	 ﾠα.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSimilarly,	 ﾠGenX	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠindifferent	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠengaging	 ﾠa	 ﾠprepared	 ﾠcandidate	 ﾠand	 ﾠretreating,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠif	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠif	 ﾠ	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠwλ/(λ	 ﾠ+	 ﾠ(1	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠλ)	 ﾠq)	 ﾠ+	 ﾠ100	 ﾠ(1	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠλ)	 ﾠq/(λ	 ﾠ+	 ﾠ(1	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠλ)	 ﾠq)	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ0,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠsimplifies	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠq	 ﾠ=	 ﾠwλ/(100	 ﾠ(1	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠλ)).	 ﾠ
Notice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠq	 ﾠis	 ﾠalways	 ﾠpositive,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhenever	 ﾠλ	 ﾠ<	 ﾠ
100/(100	 ﾠ+	 ﾠw)	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠfeasible	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠless	 ﾠthan	 ﾠone.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠλ	 ﾠ<	 ﾠ100/(100	 ﾠ+	 ﾠ
w),	 ﾠthere	 ﾠexists	 ﾠa	 ﾠPBE	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠLG	 ﾠalways	 ﾠprepares,	 ﾠa	 ﾠweak	 ﾠLG	 ﾠ
prepares	 ﾠwith	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠq,	 ﾠand	 ﾠGenX	 ﾠalways	 ﾠengages	 ﾠa	 ﾠretreating	 ﾠarmy	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
engages	 ﾠa	 ﾠprepared	 ﾠarmy	 ﾠwith	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠr	 ﾠ=	 ﾠα.	 ﾠ	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Uniqueness	 ﾠof	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠfollows	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠranges	 ﾠof	 ﾠλ	 ﾠunder	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
possible	 ﾠequilibria	 ﾠexist.	 ﾠQED	 ﾠ
Given	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠLi	 ﾠGuang	 ﾠhad	 ﾠa	 ﾠreputation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
skilled	 ﾠgeneral,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠthat	 ﾠλ	 ﾠwas	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠlarge.	 ﾠGiven	 ﾠa	 ﾠsufficiently	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠ
λ,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunique	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠinvolves	 ﾠLG	 ﾠalways	 ﾠpreparing	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbattle,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ
he	 ﾠis	 ﾠweak.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠGenX	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnever	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠbattle	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠa	 ﾠprepared	 ﾠ
opponent	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge-ﾭ‐enough	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthat	 ﾠopponent	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
strong.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠalternatively	 ﾠλ	 ﾠis	 ﾠsufficiently	 ﾠsmall,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunique	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠmixed	 ﾠ
strategies	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠweak	 ﾠLG	 ﾠmixing	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠpreparing	 ﾠand	 ﾠretreating.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
probability	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠweak	 ﾠLG	 ﾠprepares	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbattle	 ﾠis	 ﾠjust	 ﾠenough	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠGenX	 ﾠ
indifferent	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠattacking	 ﾠand	 ﾠretreating	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠobserves	 ﾠhis	 ﾠopponent	 ﾠ
preparing.	 ﾠSimilarly,	 ﾠGenX	 ﾠattacks	 ﾠa	 ﾠprepared	 ﾠopponent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠis	 ﾠjust	 ﾠenough	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠa	 ﾠweak	 ﾠLG	 ﾠindifferent	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠpreparing	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
battle	 ﾠand	 ﾠfleeing.	 ﾠEven	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠLG	 ﾠis	 ﾠvery	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠweak	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠλ	 ﾠapproaches	 ﾠzero),	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠstill	 ﾠinvolves	 ﾠhim	 ﾠpreparing	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbattle	 ﾠwith	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠ
probability.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Corollary	 ﾠ2	 ﾠhighlights	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkey	 ﾠtake-ﾭ‐away	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproposition.	 ﾠA	 ﾠproof	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠomitted	 ﾠsince	 ﾠit	 ﾠfollows	 ﾠimmediately	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠProposition	 ﾠ1.	 ﾠ
Corollary	 ﾠ2:	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠthat	 ﾠLG	 ﾠis	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠis	 ﾠsufficiently	 ﾠhigh,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
unique	 ﾠPBE	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠpure	 ﾠstrategies:	 ﾠLG	 ﾠalways	 ﾠprepares	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbattle,	 ﾠand	 ﾠGenX	 ﾠ
always	 ﾠretreats.	 ﾠOtherwise,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunique	 ﾠPBE	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠmixed	 ﾠstrategies:	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠLG	 ﾠ
always	 ﾠprepares	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbattle,	 ﾠa	 ﾠweak	 ﾠLG	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠprepares	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbattle,	 ﾠand	 ﾠGenX	 ﾠ
sometimes	 ﾠretreats.	 ﾠUnder	 ﾠno	 ﾠparameter	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠa	 ﾠweak	 ﾠLG	 ﾠalways	 ﾠretreat.	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A	 ﾠweak	 ﾠLG	 ﾠpreparing	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbattle	 ﾠis	 ﾠalways	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunique	 ﾠPBE	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠgame.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsuccessful,	 ﾠLi	 ﾠGuang’s	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠof	 ﾠpreparing	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbattle	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
require	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopposing	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠhe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠstrong.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠonly	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopposing	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠrecognize	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠenough	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠLi	 ﾠGuang	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠit	 ﾠnot	 ﾠworthwhile	 ﾠto	 ﾠattack	 ﾠLi	 ﾠGuang’s	 ﾠ
troops.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠpreparing	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbattle	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠweak	 ﾠworks	 ﾠbest	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠa	 ﾠreputation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠusually	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠstrong.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobably	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
being	 ﾠstrong,	 ﾠλ,	 ﾠis	 ﾠlow,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠstill	 ﾠobserve	 ﾠ(with	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠprobability)	 ﾠLi	 ﾠGuang	 ﾠ
preparing	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbattle	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopposing	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠretreating	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠ
outcome.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Legend	 ﾠof	 ﾠZhuge	 ﾠLiang	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠempty	 ﾠcity	 ﾠ
During	 ﾠthe	 ﾠThree	 ﾠKingdom	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠof	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠ(228	 ﾠA.D.),	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠ
Zhuge	 ﾠLiang	 ﾠwas	 ﾠfaced	 ﾠwith	 ﾠdefending	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcity	 ﾠof	 ﾠXicheng	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠimpending	 ﾠ
attack	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpowerful	 ﾠarmy.11	 ﾠThe	 ﾠgeneral,	 ﾠfamous	 ﾠ
amongst	 ﾠhis	 ﾠcontemporaries	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhis	 ﾠcareful	 ﾠstrategy,	 ﾠknew	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
surely	 ﾠface	 ﾠdefeat	 ﾠin	 ﾠbattle.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠresponse,	 ﾠZhuge	 ﾠLiang	 ﾠordered	 ﾠhis	 ﾠmen	 ﾠto	 ﾠopen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgates	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcity	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
remain	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠsight.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠthen	 ﾠwent	 ﾠup	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠwatchtower	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcity	 ﾠwalls	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
which,	 ﾠin	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠanyone	 ﾠapproaching	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcity,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠbegan	 ﾠcomposing	 ﾠmusic	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
his	 ﾠzither	 ﾠ(traditional	 ﾠmusical	 ﾠinstrument).	 ﾠ	 ﾠUpon	 ﾠseeing	 ﾠZhuge	 ﾠLiang	 ﾠ
composing	 ﾠmusic	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwatchtower,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapproaching	 ﾠarmy	 ﾠwas	 ﾠuncertain	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠwas	 ﾠtrying	 ﾠto	 ﾠlure	 ﾠthem	 ﾠinto	 ﾠan	 ﾠambush,	 ﾠor	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠhe	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠbluffing.	 ﾠGiven	 ﾠZhuge	 ﾠLiang’s	 ﾠreputation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcareful	 ﾠstrategy,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchance	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
11	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition	 ﾠto	 ﾠappearing	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommentaries	 ﾠfor	 ﾠThe	 ﾠArt	 ﾠof	 ﾠWar	 ﾠand	 ﾠThirty-ﾭSix	 ﾠStratagems,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠlegend	 ﾠof	 ﾠZhuge	 ﾠLiang	 ﾠalso	 ﾠappears	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠancient	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠnovel	 ﾠThree	 ﾠKingdoms	 ﾠ(Luo	 ﾠ
Guanzhong	 ﾠ14th	 ﾠcentury/2004).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 14	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠan	 ﾠambush	 ﾠwas	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠenough	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenemy	 ﾠarmy	 ﾠchose	 ﾠto	 ﾠbypass	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcity	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠengaging	 ﾠin	 ﾠbattle.	 ﾠZhuge	 ﾠLiang	 ﾠheld	 ﾠonto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcity,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
strengthened	 ﾠhis	 ﾠreputation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcunning	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠstrategy.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠsimilarities	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstories	 ﾠof	 ﾠZhuge	 ﾠLiang	 ﾠand	 ﾠLi	 ﾠGuang	 ﾠare	 ﾠobvious.	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠstraightforward	 ﾠto	 ﾠapply	 ﾠthe	 ﾠframework	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠSection	 ﾠ2	 ﾠto	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Empty	 ﾠCity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ2	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠan	 ﾠextensive	 ﾠform	 ﾠinterpretation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgame,	 ﾠ
listing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpayoffs	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠfor	 ﾠZhuge	 ﾠLiang	 ﾠ(i.e.,	 ﾠZL)	 ﾠthen	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapproaching	 ﾠ
army.	 ﾠ
[Insert	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ2	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhere.]	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠZL	 ﾠorders	 ﾠhis	 ﾠsoldiers	 ﾠto	 ﾠflee,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapproaching	 ﾠarmy	 ﾠcaptures	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcity	 ﾠ(of	 ﾠ
value	 ﾠc)	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠa	 ﾠfight.12	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠhe	 ﾠremains	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcity	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapproaching	 ﾠarmy	 ﾠ
retreats,	 ﾠneither	 ﾠplayer	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠany	 ﾠgains	 ﾠor	 ﾠlosses.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠhe	 ﾠremains	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
city	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapproaching	 ﾠarmy	 ﾠattacks,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpayoffs	 ﾠdepend	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠ
ZL’s	 ﾠforces	 ﾠare	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠor	 ﾠweak.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠhis	 ﾠforces	 ﾠare	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠ(i.e.,	 ﾠsizable	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
prepared	 ﾠto	 ﾠfight),	 ﾠthen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠearns	 ﾠpayoff	 ﾠw	 ﾠ>	 ﾠ0	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠfight	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
approaching	 ﾠarmy	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠloss.	 ﾠIf,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠhis	 ﾠforces	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠweak,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠZL	 ﾠfaces	 ﾠloss	 ﾠ–y	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠbattle,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠy	 ﾠ>	 ﾠc	 ﾠsince	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠlose	 ﾠboth	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcity	 ﾠand	 ﾠhis	 ﾠtroops.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠprefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠkeep	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcity	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠflee;	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠ
fleeing	 ﾠis	 ﾠpreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠremaining	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcity	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠattacked.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgame	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠidentified	 ﾠin	 ﾠSection	 ﾠ3	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠstory	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ100	 ﾠhorsemen.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
12	 ﾠUnlike	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠfleeing	 ﾠresults	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠloss	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcity,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
necessarily	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopposing	 ﾠarmy	 ﾠchasing	 ﾠZL’s	 ﾠtroops	 ﾠdown.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠZL	 ﾠmay	 ﾠflee	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcity	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapproaching	 ﾠarmy	 ﾠarrives.	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Proposition	 ﾠ3:	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠλ	 ﾠ≥	 ﾠy/(y	 ﾠ+	 ﾠw),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunique	 ﾠPBE	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠpooling	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠZL	 ﾠalways	 ﾠstays	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcity,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapproaching	 ﾠarmy	 ﾠretreats.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
When	 ﾠλ	 ﾠ<	 ﾠy/(y	 ﾠ+	 ﾠw),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunique	 ﾠPBE	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠmixed-ﾭstrategies,	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠZL	 ﾠstays	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠ1	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠand	 ﾠstays	 ﾠwith	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠwλ/(y	 ﾠ(1	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠλ))	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠweak;	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapproaching	 ﾠarmy	 ﾠattacks	 ﾠwith	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠc/y.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Proof:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠproof	 ﾠis	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠidentical	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproof	 ﾠto	 ﾠProposition	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠ
substituting	 ﾠ(y,-ﾭ‐y)	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpayoffs	 ﾠ(100,-ﾭ‐100),	 ﾠand	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠto	 ﾠestablish	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrictly	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopposing	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠto	 ﾠengage	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠZL	 ﾠ
flees	 ﾠHere,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠZL	 ﾠflees	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopposing	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠalways	 ﾠcaptures	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcity	 ﾠ
resulting	 ﾠin	 ﾠpayoffs	 ﾠ(-ﾭ‐z,z)	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ(-ﾭ‐100β,	 ﾠ100β)	 ﾠor	 ﾠ(-ﾭ‐100α,	 ﾠ100α)	 ﾠas	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcase	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠgame.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmethod	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsolving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
unchanged	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠabove,	 ﾠand	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrepeated	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠQED	 ﾠ
Corollary	 ﾠ4	 ﾠfollows	 ﾠimmediately	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠProposition	 ﾠ3.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Corollary	 ﾠ4:	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠthat	 ﾠZL	 ﾠis	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠis	 ﾠsufficiently	 ﾠhigh,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
unique	 ﾠPBE	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠpure	 ﾠstrategies:	 ﾠZL	 ﾠalways	 ﾠstays,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapproaching	 ﾠarmy	 ﾠ
always	 ﾠretreats.	 ﾠOtherwise,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunique	 ﾠPBE	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠmixed	 ﾠstrategies:	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠZL	 ﾠ
always	 ﾠstays,	 ﾠa	 ﾠweak	 ﾠZL	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠstays,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapproaching	 ﾠarmy	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠ
retreats.	 ﾠUnder	 ﾠno	 ﾠparameter	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠa	 ﾠweak	 ﾠZL	 ﾠalways	 ﾠflee.	 ﾠ
Given	 ﾠZhuge	 ﾠLiu’s	 ﾠreputation	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmasterful	 ﾠstrategist,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠthat	 ﾠλ	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
large	 ﾠenough	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunique	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠinvolves	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠalways	 ﾠstaying	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcity.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠλ	 ﾠwas	 ﾠsmall,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmixed-ﾭ‐strategy	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠstill	 ﾠ
involves	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠstaying	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcity	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠweak.	 ﾠHere	 ﾠagain,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠlegendary	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠis	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunique	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
game.	 ﾠ	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Conclusion	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠdevelop	 ﾠsimple,	 ﾠgame-ﾭ‐theoretic	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠof	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠlegendary	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
military	 ﾠdeception	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠhistory.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠboth	 ﾠexamples,	 ﾠa	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠleading	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠforce	 ﾠis	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠconflict	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠarmy	 ﾠ(preventing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
slaughter	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠsoldiers	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠloss	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcity)	 ﾠby	 ﾠacting	 ﾠas	 ﾠif	 ﾠhis	 ﾠsoldiers	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ
part	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠforce	 ﾠattempting	 ﾠto	 ﾠbait	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠopponent	 ﾠinto	 ﾠan	 ﾠambush.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Both	 ﾠstories	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠwidely	 ﾠcited	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠ(since	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠoccurrence	 ﾠ
two-ﾭ‐thousand	 ﾠyears	 ﾠago)	 ﾠas	 ﾠillustrating	 ﾠcreative	 ﾠsolutions	 ﾠto	 ﾠdire	 ﾠsituations	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbattlefield.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgenerals’	 ﾠtactics	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠretreat	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
opponents	 ﾠare	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunique	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠsituations.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
fact,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠalways	 ﾠinvolves	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgenerals	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠopponents	 ﾠacting	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdid	 ﾠwith	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠa	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠprobability.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhat’s	 ﾠremarkable	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠof	 ﾠLi	 ﾠGuang	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Zhuge	 ﾠLiang	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ“unusual”	 ﾠapproach,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcould	 ﾠ
engage	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcircular	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠderive	 ﾠoptimal	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠunder	 ﾠ
incomplete	 ﾠinformation.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠdid	 ﾠso	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠan	 ﾠadvanced	 ﾠ
understanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠand	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠnever	 ﾠread	 ﾠHarsanyi	 ﾠ
(1967)’s	 ﾠseminal	 ﾠwork	 ﾠon	 ﾠmodeling	 ﾠincomplete	 ﾠinformation.	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠdiscussed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintroduction,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgame-ﾭ‐theoretic	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠcareful	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠfamous	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠhistory.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠcontributes	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliteratures	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠgame	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠis	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
develop	 ﾠa	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠhistoric	 ﾠevents,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeception	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
gain	 ﾠstrategic	 ﾠadvantage,	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠability	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperienced	 ﾠprofessionals	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
intuitively	 ﾠplay	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠstrategies.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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Figure	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 ﾠZhuge	 ﾠLiang,	 ﾠExtensive	 ﾠForm	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